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Abstract
Since the year 2000, there have been close to two thousand deaths of asylum seekers
at sea as a result of foiled attempts to travel to Australia in order to seek protection under the
United Nations Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees.1 Many thousands more
have made it to shore. Growing numbers of irregular or unauthorized migrants attempting to
reach the United States and the European Union has long been known as a contentious
policy issue in these states, but perhaps less known is the situation on the other side of the
Pacific. Australia is the eight-largest recipient of asylum seekers in the industrialized world,
receiving around 4% of the global applications for asylum, a relatively minimal amount
considering that the state has the capacity to take on a much greater burden of the
international refugee crisis.2 In addition, the policies that are currently in place are primarily
seeking to deter the arrival of ‘boat people’ and associated people smuggling activity, rather
than to constructively manage the flow while upholding the individual rights of those seeking
refuge under international law. This paper deconstructs the restrictive policies of the
Australian government and proposes a more sustainable solution, drawing widely from
research literature, government publications and media reports that use both primary and
secondary sources to build a strong case for an alternative program. The policy that I found
best balances the costs and benefits for both the asylum seekers in question as well as the
Australian government is a combination of short-term onshore detention and communitybased processing and integration. There is a robust debate in Australia over refugees and
asylum policy, but in order for such a bill to be feasible in the Australian context, a major
transformation of the public’s attitude is essential.
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The study sponsored by Monash University has compiled a database of border deaths, and has found that 1911
deaths have occurred at sea since 2000, how the true numbers are not known as there is no official government
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See: Macleod, Kenneth. "Deadly Voyages: Border Related Deaths Associated with Australia." SBS News. April
23, 2015, and "Australian Border Deaths Database." Monash University: The Border Crossing Observatory.
October, 2014 and Bullock, Chris. "Asylum Seekers: Drowning on Our Watch." ABC Radio National.
September 1, 2013.
2
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“A Sustainable Solution” 3

For those who’ve come across the seas,
We’ve boundless plains to share,
With courage let us all combine,
To advance Australia fair.3

Part I: Introduction
Australia is a multicultural nation of immigrants; close to 50% of the population were
born overseas or at least one of their parents was a migrant to Australia.4 In addition, recent
studies show that more than 80% of the general population believes that this multiculturalism
has been beneficial for Australia.5 Considering these statistics, it may seem paradoxical that
the Australian government takes such a hard stance against ‘boat people:’ asylum seekers
who make a life-risking decision to travel to Australia in the hope that they will be granted
refugee status and protection. The purpose of my thesis is to critically analyze the current
package of policies related to boat people, the Refugee Status Determination (RSD)
procedures particular to them and their resettlement, and to propose an alternative plan that is
more appropriate to the ideal goals of the Australian government, as well as being sustainable
in the long-term. I will do this by determining concrete goals, defining a set of clear
objectives, and establishing evaluation criteria that function as prerequisites for any policy
that is to provide a counter offer to what is currently in place. It must be noted that I am
approaching this issue with the inclination that Australia is both legally and morally obliged
to ensure that the rights of all refugees, regardless of their origin or mode of arrival, are
upheld.
First, I will define the situation by describing the contextual backdrop to the current
political debate, including a brief history of developments concerning boat people in
Australia, and the critical factors of causality that underpin the situation both within Australia
and externally. For the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on the deep causes (the
extenuating circumstances that are forcing people to seek refuge outside of their home
country), the intermediate causes and the precipitating causes. By taking a closer look at these
levels of causality, I can present a policy that will more credible than if I had not taken the
time to investigate what is driving the Australian government’s adoption of this particular
brand of refugee policy.
To put the current situation in perspective, it is important to understand the origins of
the refugee debate. Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the young United
Nations was faced with the rapidly expanding number of people displaced by the War, many
fearing persecution if they returned to their place of birth. This unprecedented movement of
people en masse saw the member states of the UN come together in an effort to both define
3

Peter D. McCormick, “Advance Australia Fair,” © 1878 by the Commonwealth of Australia.
"Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 Census, 2012–2013." Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013
5
Prof. Andrew Markus "Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys 2014." Monash
University, 2014.
4
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the issue and create an international framework for managing it. The result was the 1951
United Nations Refugee Convention, which outlines the definition of a refugee, as well as the
responsibilities of host states regarding the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. The
Convention states that a refugee is someone who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."6 An Asylum Seeker,
in contrast, is a person who claims to be a need protection under the Refugee Convention, but
whose status has not yet been determined as meeting the criteria stated above.
The Convention is just one part of a large body of international law related to human
rights in general, and the rights pertaining to asylum seekers and refugees in particular.
Australia has ratified both the Convention and the 1967 Protocol that amended it; therefore,
the obligations that are designed to constrain the government as a result of UN membership
and ratification of these documents should be acknowledged when considering the debate
over refugee policy. While Australia’s approach to people seeking asylum has a diverse track
record, the last several decades has witnessed a significant tightening of the measures in
place, as well as a hardening attitude toward boat people in particular.7 Since the early 1970s,
when the White Australia Policy was abolished and Vietnamese refugees began arriving on
Australia’s shores, there has been a steady increase in the number of asylum seekers
travelling by boat from South East Asia and Indonesia in order to claim protection under the
Refugee Convention. Ideally, the Australian government would respond to these flows of
people in a manner that is consistent with their reputation as a Western liberal democracy, by
upholding the principles and laws that are fundamental to the legitimacy of the international
system as it exists today.
The specific group with which I am concerned for the purpose of this thesis consists
of the asylum seekers who arrive by boat, labeled Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMAs) by the
Australian government, who are generally found to be legitimate refugees but who, under the
current provisions of the policy, are not being afforded due process nor are they being
resettled within Australia. I will go into more detail regarding the specifics of the current
policy in Part III, but in my opinion, it is essential that the government responsible for
processing the claims of asylum seekers who arrive within its borders, regardless of the mode
of transportation involved, are equally obliged to provide a fair assessment. This complies
6

"Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees." United Nations Human Rights. July 28, 1951.
Australia's Migration Act 1958, instated just four years following the ratification of the refugee convention
“requires people who are not Australian citizens and do not hold a valid visa to be detained. Unless they are
given legal permission to remain in Australia by being granted a visa, such unlawful non-citizens must be
removed from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable...” Then in 1989, the Hawke government sponsored
the Migration Legislation Amendment Act which included mandatory deportation of “illegal entrants” and the
recovery of funds from asylum seekers to pay for the costs of their detention and deportation. Detainees were
also denied access to bail, and there was no limit to the length of their detention. When asylum was not granted,
asylum seekers were removed. Other key legislation was introduced by the Keating government in the early
1990s, such as mandatory detention for “unlawful immigrants” and the 2001 Border Protection Bill initiated by
PM Howard, which allowed the government to remove any ship in Australia’s territorial waters.
7
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with the requirements dictated by the Convention, as will be discussed further. In principle,
those responsible for developing the policy in question would adhere to the directives of the
Convention in full.
Before I continue, it is imperative that I lay out the specific policy goals I have
devised, which will drive the following analysis and policy proposal. The primary goal of the
Australian government should be as follows:
Irregular Maritime Arrivals are processed in accordance with our obligations to
international law regarding refugees and human rights, and those found to be
legitimate refugees are permanently resettled in Australia.
While I do believe that Australia has a moral obligation to ensure humane and just treatment
of the asylum seekers that attempt to make Australia home, most compelling is the legal
requirement for doing so. I have also established a secondary goal that is relevant to this
paper, but will not be fully addressed by my policy initiative:
A regionally-agreed approach combating illegal people smuggling activity is
established, thus reducing the strain that thousands of boat arrivals place on the
Australian government, as well as decreasing the human risk involved in treacherous
boat journeys (see Deep Cause-2 below)8.
The principle purpose of this paper is to raise the issues inherent to the refugee status
determination procedure currently in place and put forward an alternative option that is better
suited to meeting the primary goal as outlined above. However, the secondary goal must be
addressed at some point in the near future in order for domestic policy changes to make a
significant impact on the complex regional nature of the issue. Although governments are
often compelled to prioritize particular goals over others for a number of reasons, I argue that
the Australians are taking a short-term approach that is successful in securing their borders,
yet is undermining political longevity and sustainability, their credibility as a responsible
member of the international community, and the basic human rights of thousands of asylum
seekers. Ultimately I believe like James Souter that “durable solutions can act as forms of
reparation for the unjust harms of displacement,” but what composes a durable solution, and
for whom are we repairing the unjust harms?9

8

For example, a “Regional Deterrence Framework was initially proposed as part of Operation Sovereign
Borders, and was set to include a communications campaign, or “village watch,”, a boat buy-back scheme, and
an intelligence arm to intervene with the people smuggling operations in Indonesia. While there are certainly
faults with the policy, this is a starting place for increased cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.
From: Rosanna Ryan, "Tony Abbott, Scott Morrison Announce New 'Regional Deterrence Framework' to Stop
Asylum Seekers." ABC News. August 23, 2013.
9
James Souter, "Durable Solutions as Reparation for the Unjust Harms of Displacement: Who Owes What to
Refugees?" Journal of Refugee Studies 27, no. 2 (2013): 171-90.
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Part II: The Problem – Levels of Causality
Each year, the Australian government’s Department of Immigration and Border
Protection (DIBP) accepts a predetermined number of asylum seekers who either apply for
refugee status once they have arrived (with a valid visa) or apply from abroad as part of the
Humanitarian Program. Individuals in the latter category have often been identified as being
in need of resettlement by the UNHCR. While these numbers have increased somewhat in
recent years,10 the formulated annual quota is still well below meeting the need, considering
that there are over 15 million refugees worldwide, but is in line with the relative intakes of
the United States and Canada.11 Europe, on the other hand, faces a dramatically more
complicated situation. The geopolitical location of the European continent lends itself to a
high rate of refugee applications and boat arrivals; the EU received close to a quarter of a
million applications for resettlement in 2014 alone, and Italy was faced with upwards of
85,000 boat arrivals by August of that year.12 The European Union cannot afford the luxury
of being selective in their refugee policies, and while Australia has the advantage of being a
relatively isolated continent with no land borders, it is not absolved of its responsibilities to
the global refugee problem, including managing IMAs sufficiently.
Since 1976, the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat has regularly increased,
with the most notable spikes being recorded between 1991-2001 and 2009-2013. These highs
correlate to the period directly prior to the establishment of the Pacific Solution by Prime
Minister John Howard, and following its dismantling upon the election of Kevin Rudd in
2007.
Table 2.1: Number of Boats and People arriving in Australia 1989-201313
Year

Number of Boats

Number of People (excludes crew)

1989

1

26

1990

2

198

10

Between 2008 and 2012, Australia accepted approximately 13,000 refugees as part of the Humanitarian
Programme, which was increased significantly to 20,000 in 2013. 20% of those accepted were of Iraqi origin,
with Afghanistan and Myanmar being the two countries with the next highest number of applicants. This
increased intake may be a response to the similarly raised number of applications; in 2012–13, a total of 50 444
people lodged applications under the offshore programme component compared with 42 928 in 2011–12. From
"Fact Sheet 60 – Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Programme." Australian Government: Department of
Immigration and Border Protection. August 7, 2014.
11
The United States accepts over 80,000 refugee and asylum applicants every year, an almost statistically
insignificant number given the population of 318 million people, while Canada grants resettlement to
approximately 10,000 refugees each year. Sources: Lara, Burt, and Batalova Jeanne. "Refugees and Asylees in
the United States." Migration Policy Institute, February 3, 2014 and "The Refugee System in Canada,"
Government of Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Communications Branch. June 17, 2014.
12
2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile - Northern, Western, Central and Southern Europe." UNHCR.
13
Source: Phillips, Janet. "Boat Arrivals in Australia: A Quick Guide to the Statistics."Parliamentary Library:
Research Paper Series 2013-14, 2014.
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1991

6

214

1992

6

216

1993

3

81

1994

18

953

1995

7

237

1996

19

660

1997

11

339

1998

17

200

1999

86

3721

2000

51

2939

200114

43

5516

2002

1

1

2003

1

53

2004

1

15

2005

4

11

2006

6

60

2007

5

148

2008

7

161

200915

60

2276

2010

134

6555

2011

69

4565

2012

278

17204

2013

300

20587

2014 (to July 17)16

0

0

14

This year marked the greatest number of boat arrivals thus far, and was also a political turning point due to the
Tampa incident (See footnote 18).
15
We can see the marked difference that the dismantling of the Pacific Solution made on boat arrivals in 2008
had on the numbers of the subsequent years.
16
This rapid decrease (or complete elimination) of boat arrivals suggests that Rudd’s reinstatement of the
Pacific Solution has achieved its goal of “stopping the boats” yet the absence of any recorded arrivals does not
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There have been several key turning points in the evolution of today’s policy, which
encompasses a former policy under Howard known as the Pacific Solution and the Abbottgovernment invention called Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). The Pacific Solution was a
reaction to the rapidly increasing numbers of IMAs in the late 1990s, primarily from Iraq and
Afghanistan. The key features of the Pacific Solution that survive today are as follows: the
Australian government has the power to remove any ship in its territorial borders, with no
asylum applications able to be made on board, the excision of several islands from
Australia’s migration zone, and an agreement with Nauru to host a Regional Processing
Center (RPC) in exchange for development aid.17 A triggering event for the development of
the measures in practice today was the Tampa incident of 2001.18 Following this drawn-out
debacle, John Howard stated “We decide who comes into this country and the circumstances
in which they come,” echoing the sentiments of former Prime Minister Bob Hawke, who in
passing the 1989 Migration Amendment Act that tightened the constraints on would-be
refugees, said “Bob is not your uncle.” 19 This policy, although widely criticized by refugee
advocates internal and external to Australia, remained in place until it was removed on an
election promise of Labor Party candidate to the 2007 Australian Federal Election, Kevin
Rudd. In an astonishing about-face, Rudd returned to the top job in 2013 only to reinstate the
Pacific Solution in its entirety, in order to combat the increasing instances of boat arrivals that
were verging on out of control (see Table 2.1).
If the policy alternative I propose to be deemed credible, it is necessary to confront
the critical causes driving the pipeline of boat people as well as the Australian government’s
restrictive response. To effectively deal with the various factors involved, a method of
causality must be applied; in this case, I will categorize causes based on whether they are
deep, intermediate or precipitating.20

mean that there has not been any attempted sea voyages made my asylum seekers, especially as one of the key
measures of Operation Sovereign Borders is interdiction-at-sea. See: "Asylum Seekers Still Trying to Reach
Australia, Says Head of Operation Sovereign Borders." ABC News. January 28, 2015.
17
Nathan Hancock, "Border Protection Bill 2001." Parliament of Australia. August 29, 2001 and various
Migration Legislation Amendments 2001-2. See: "Bills Digests Alphabetical Index 2001-02." Parliament of
Australia. 2002.
18
In August 2001, MV Tampa, a Norwegian tanker ship came across a sinking fishing vessel, just outside
Australian waters, that held over 400 asylum seekers from the Middle East, primarily Afghanistan. With the
situation becoming desperate, the Captain brought the asylum seekers onboard. After a standoff lasting several
days, the Australian government, under PM Howard, denied the ship entry to Australia, and those onboard were
taken to camps in Papua New Guinea.
See Rebecca Hamlin, “Let Me Be a Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in United States,
Canada, and Australia” New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 55 and Peter D. Fox, “International Asylum
and Boat People: The Tampa Affair and Australia’s “Pacific Solution”, 25 Md. J. Int’l L. 356 (2010).
19
Hamlin, “Let Me Be a Refugee,” 53-55
20
As cited by Ingram in “A Useful Way to Think about Causation” from Joseph Nye, Understanding
International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History, (NY: Longman, 2000), p. 70.
Deep causes are those that are remote in time but necessary, intermediate are also necessary but recent in time
and precipitating are causes that are directly linked to the event, and can be necessary or sufficient.

“A Sustainable Solution” 9

Deep Causes – The Pipeline
1. The Instability of the Nation-State:
Significant research has been conducted on the root causes for mass movements of
people who leave their country in search of a new home, due to fear or persecution. One such
study was done by Charles Keely, a Professor of International Migration, at Georgetown
University, who arrived at three founding problems that compel citizens to flee the state. He
states that refugee flows are created when there is multinational conflict, revolution, or state
failure, none of which are mutually exclusive.21 If we are to specifically look at the case of
Australia and the sources of asylum seekers, multinational conflict and revolution was
driving people out of Vietnam and Cambodia and into refugee channels to Australia during
the latter part of the 20th Century. In the period of 1976-81 which Katherine Betts labels the
first wave of boat people, over 2,000 Vietnamese asylum seekers arrived on the coast of
Australia and refugee status and residency were granted almost immediately.22 The second
wave yielded much greater numbers; between 1991 and 2001, over 12,000 asylum seekers
took a sea route, primarily originating from Iraq and Afghanistan.23 State failure is the most
relevant factor when considering what is pushing this particular stream of refugees;
authoritarian rule, corruption, sectarian violence, and human rights abuses have become
almost endemic in this region. Recently, intrastate conflict in Syria, and continued instability
in Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Africa such as Somalia and Sudan, is driving the high
numbers of asylum seekers applying for protection.
From the perspective of the Australian government, this deep cause is a transnational
issue that is largely beyond their control. The internal conditions of other states and their
driving of people elsewhere are not within the jurisdiction of the Australians, however the
effects of conflict and state failure can be somewhat mitigated by aid packages and
collaboration within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. It is unlikely that the
worldwide refugee problem will be alleviated in the near future; in fact, it is growing
exponentially dire in the current climate of international relations.24 With this is mind, it is of
utmost importance that Australia does not back away from its commitment to the global
community, and take feasible actions within their control that contribute to a sustainable
solution.
2. International crime networks and people smugglers:
As the numbers of people attempting to reach Australia by boat climbed into the
thousands, it became clear that people smuggling – illegal under international law and
defined by the United Nations as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
21

Charles Keely, "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows."International Migration Review
30, no. 4 (2006): 1046-066. A state may fail due to war and its consequences, the removal of external supports,
corruption, and natural disaster.
22
Katharine Betts. "Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia." People and Place 9, no. 4
23
Ibid
24
"Global Issues at the United Nations: Refugees – the Numbers," UN News Center. 2015.
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financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which
the person is not a national or a permanent resident” – was involved.25 The Protocol asks that
governments criminalize people smuggling and instate penalties for such activity, yet the
definition quite clearly states that there must be a financial or material benefit involved in
order to qualify assistance for illicit entry into a state as people smuggling. Thus if conduct
that would otherwise fall into the category above is driven by humanitarian motivations, it
does not fall under the criminal offense of people smuggling. This is important to note in the
Australian context, which I will elaborate upon further. The Australian government passed
the Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act in 2010 which “makes it an offence for a
person (the first person) to organize or facilitate the bringing or coming to Australia, or the
entry or proposed entry into Australia, of another person (the second person), where that
second person is a non-citizen of Australia, and where the second person had, or has, no
lawful right to come to Australia,” a law that has had limited reach thus far.26
The primary departure point for boats to Australia that have been coordinated by
people smugglers is Indonesia, due in part to its relatively lenient visa laws and frequent
corruption amongst government officials, although Malaysia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and even
China have been locations from which asylum seekers have traveled by sea in the past. Until
2011, people smuggling was not a criminal offense in Indonesia, yet with the passage of the
Law on Immigration that year, penalties for people smuggling were put in place and dozens
of convictions were handed down within the first year.27 Despite this early apparent success,
the effectiveness in the long-term of this approach is questionable, as Indonesian authorities
are convicting people that are primarily involved with the lower levels of the “business,”
usually opportunistic fishermen who can be easily replaced. This brings me to an important
part of the people smuggling discussion; the idea that there is a structure to the network of
illicit activity that can be targeted and broken down.
In recent years, especially in the context of the renewed Pacific Solution, Australian
politicians have repeatedly referred to the “business model” of the people smugglers, yet
what this entails precisely has been sparsely articulated. A report on the subject, conducted by
the Australian Parliament in 2013, has found that there is in fact, no one single model for
people smuggling. Drawing on both international and Australian research, the report found
that far from a highly structured or hierarchical international criminal network, people
smuggling is a decentralized and flexible system, comprised of many smaller units that have
no clear relation to one another, aside from occasional collaboration on an individual basis.28
The paper notes that this loose network could perhaps be labeled an ‘enterprise model,’
which has the advantage of being highly flexible and adaptable in the face of change and
difficult to eradicate because each ‘unit’ is so replaceable.
25

The United Nations “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air” November 15, 2000,
as cited in Barker, Cat, “The People Smugglers' Business Model." Parliament of Australia: Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Security Section, no. Research Paper No. 2 2012-13 (2013).
26
"People Smuggling Legislation." Australian Government: Attorney General's Department. 2010.
27
Missbach, Antje. "Prosecuting People Smugglers in Indonesia." The Conversation. September 17, 2013.
28
Barker, Cat. "The People Smugglers' Business Model," 2013.
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The larger point here is that due to the diversity in location, methodology (air as well
as sea routes), the level of structure, in addition to the key motivations behind the “business,”
there is no single identifiable model which can be combated by any given policy.
Furthermore, despite the emphasis placed on people smuggling in the debate on boat people,
there has been very limited research conducted on the topic in the Australian context. Since
the protocol came into effect in 2004, there have been relatively few convictions of people
involved in people smuggling in Australia and of those convicted, most were noted as filling
a ‘transporter’ role; assisting the physical travel of the asylum seekers concerned, rather than
holding broader organizational roles. Important to take into consideration is that several
convictions have actually been overturned on the grounds that the “people smugglers” in
question, were not acting for material gain. Rather, in some specific cases, those involved
were actually asylum seekers themselves, or were attempting to facilitate the arrival of their
families to Australia.29 The case of one man has even led to him being labeled the “Schindler
of Asia.”30
However, there are quite clearly many individuals and groups profiting from their
people smuggling operations. Prices vary greatly, but the Australian Parliament found that
IMAs paid between $4,900 and $15,700 for their journey to Australia in 2009-10.31 As
already mentioned, people smuggling occurs via airplanes in addition to sea voyages, and
taking the air route is drastically more costly as travel documents need to be forged that grant
entry into Australia. This is where a clear distinction can be made between the methodologies
of people smuggling and asylum seeking; taking a boat with a large number of others to
Australia is quite clearly an overt act, with little or no intention of entering the country
unnoticed, whereas traveling alone and perhaps blending in with fellow airline passengers is a
covert attempt to bypass Australia’s borders. Interestingly, this distinction has been
seemingly ignored by Australian government officials and media outlets.
Moreover, as Table 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate below, the vast majority of boat people
are in fact assessed to be legitimate refugees under the UN Convention, while the refugee
status grant rate for plane arrivals is generally less than fifty percent.32 These statistics beg the
question; why is there an emphasis on criminal people smuggling in the context of boat
people when those enlisting the services of people smugglers have genuine claims to
protection?

29

One of the examples cited in the Australian Parliament report: “Mr. Al-Hashimy (a facilitator) became
involved in people smuggling in Malaysia while en route to Australia from Iran—he and his family came to
Australia on the boat to which his conviction relates and the rest of his family were granted protection visas.”
30
Haigh, Bruce. "People Smuggler or the Schindler of Asia?" ABC News: The Drum. May 6, 2012.
31
Barker, Cat. "The People Smugglers' Business Model," 2013.
32
Statistics on Asylum Seekers Arriving in Australia." Refugee Council of Australia. February, 2014.
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Table 2.2: Final grant rate (plane arrivals) 2006-07 to 2012-1333
Year

Grants

Refusals

Total decisions

Grant rate

2006-07

1,692

2,651

4,343

39.0%

2007-08

1,898

2,107

4,005

47.4%

2008-09

2,173

2,616

4,789

45.4%

2009-10

2,364

2,266

4,630

51.1%

2010-11

2,099

2,737

4,836

43.4%

2011-12

2,272

2,826

5,100

44.6%

2012-13

2,555

2,719

5,274

48.4%

Table 2.3: Final grant rate (boat arrivals) 2008-09 to 2012-13
Year

Grants

Refusals

Total decisions

Grant rate

2008-09

209

0

209

100%

2009-10

2,152

26

2,178

98.8%

2010-11

2,721

134

2,855

95.3%

2011-12

4,766

454

5,220

91.3%

2012-13

4,949

675

5,624

88.0%

This question will be best answered when I discuss the role of the media and
Australian public opinion in the policymaking process. This brief discussion of people
smuggling does, however, highlight a number of complexities for managing the pipeline of
asylum seekers arriving by boat. Due to the tangle of variables, there is no clear-cut solution
to managing this issue. While I agree with the Australian Parliament when they argue that
“striking an appropriate balance between meeting the needs of people seeking protection and
maintaining control of national borders is...a challenging proposition,” I do not concur that
threatening legitimate refugees with offshore resettlement and turning back boats in
Australian waters is sustainable, nor does it fulfill our obligations under international law.34

33
34

Statistics on Asylum Seekers Arriving in Australia." Refugee Council of Australia. February, 2014.
Cat Barker, “The People Smugglers' Business Model,” 2013.
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Intermediate Causes
1. Lack in bureaucratic consistency or administrative justice:
The system that oversees applications for refugee status is made up of two bodies –
the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) and the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) – the first of
which is responsible for protection visas which have otherwise been relevant to Irregular
Maritime Arrivals. The procedure prior to the changes brought about by the Parliament in
2013 and 2014 was as follows; the applicant had their claim assessed by the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection, and if rejected, would have the right to appeal the
decision at the RRT; submitting the appropriate documents and having the case heard in a
formal interview, with or without a lawyer, with the help of an interpreter if necessary. While
the RRT is an independent statutory body whose goal is to ensure that the review process is
“independent, fair, just, economical, informal and quick” on paper, issues have been raised
regarding the relationship between the Department – the first port of call for applications –
and the RRT. 35 Rebecca Hamlin contends that the RSD system is characterized “by a
politically charged, high-profile interbranch dispute,” as a result of the conflict between a
government agency led by the Minister for Immigration who has clear political objectives,
and an affiliate body concerned primarily with determining the legal status of asylum
seekers.36 Whether or not there is a significant conflict of interest at hand requires more
investigation, but in terms of ensuring due process as mandated under the Refugee
Convention (Chapter II, Article 16), it is particularly concerning that most cases were not
given a hearing and decisions were made in what could be labeled a subjective manner.
The changes brought in by the Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving
the Asylum Legacy Caseload Bill) in 2014 only further constrain due process for boat
arrivals. The Bill was intended to expedite the assessment of a backlog of some 30,000 boat
arrivals that date from August 2012 to December 2013, prior to the reinstatement of the
Pacific Solution.37 As before, DIBP is responsible for the initial assessment of refugee status,
with rejections being “fast tracked” for review by an Independent Assessment Authority
(IAA), whose decision will be made without any further information or an interview unless
called for by “exceptional circumstances.”38 There are several issues with conducting RSD in
this manner; the first is that the applicant is placed at a severe disadvantage if their documents
do not represent their claim adequately due to difficulties with English, a misunderstanding of
the requirements, a lack of access to legal aid or advice, or a mental or physical illness
prevents the applicant from completing the application fully. Second, the asylum seeker is
deprived of an opportunity to tell their story in a formal interview setting at the RRT, and
third, this process does not allow a thorough investigation into the applicant’s claim, with
potentially serious repercussions if the asylum seeker is returned to their country.
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Since midway through 2013, all arrivals of people “circumventing regular migration
arrangements” anywhere in Australia are transferred to Offshore Processing Centers in Nauru
and Papua New Guinea, as per Regional Resettlement Arrangements and Memorandums of
Understandings with the respective countries.39 The only exception is if the Minister for
Immigration decides to use his or her discretionary power to allow an individual to remain in
Australia to undergo processing. Therefore, the administrative procedure for assessing
refugee status for IMAs is currently governed by the laws of these third-party states. The sole
condition that the Australian government asked of Nauru and PNG is that those determined to
be refugees will ultimately be settled in the third country and treated in accordance to the
obligations of the Refugee Convention.40 Whether or not this is being upheld is contestable,
as will be discussed in Part III, yet in a bureaucratic sense there is a clear disunion of what is
expected of Australia regarding the administrative processing of refugees and the practical
nature of the issue. Concerning boat people, the question must be raised as to whether justice
is a driving objective of the RSD system, yet one thing is certain; these regulatory policies are
undermining the development of a program for determining refugee status and protecting
those found to meet the requirements, as called for by international law.
2. The Media and Public Opinion:
The heated public debate regarding boat people in Australia is multifaceted in that
there are several intertwining factors contributing to a tough general perception of refugees
and IMAs in particular. First, xenophobic attitudes are characterizing perceptions regarding
this particular group of asylum seekers. As already mentioned, the vast majority of boat
people that arrived by boat since the late 1990s have been of Middle Eastern origin. In a 2014
report by the Scanlon Foundation on social cohesion, 25% of those polled had a negative
feeling towards Muslims (compared to less than 5% polled who had negative sentiments
towards people of Christian or Buddhist faith).41 Some observers even go as far as to say that
when Iraqis and Afghanis began arriving, “the idea of the refugee began to be transformed in
Australian public consciousness from a human being worthy of compassion into a human
being deserving only our contempt.”42 To the extent that xenophobic or racist attitudes are
consciously driving the harshening of political objectives is unclear, yet is certainly an
underlying trend that should be accounted for.
Second, but along similar lines is the fear for the loss of Australian identity. What
exactly defines the Australian identity is contestable considering the distinctly multicultural
essence of Australian society, yet the Scanlon report found that in the space of a few months
from June to October 2014, the percentage that agreed that “maintaining the Australian way
39
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of life is important” jumped from 49% to 71% 43 There is a noted concern that the influx of
“outsiders” will disrupt the Australian “way of life,” and I believe this has much to do with
the portrayal of boat people by the media. A study conducted by the University of Melbourne
and Oxford University agrees with this notion, suggesting that “national anxiety drives the
populist backlash against boat people.”44
A distinctive feature of the Australian political landscape that sets it apart from other
states in relation to this particular issue is the high frequency of media coverage on boat
people. The figure below is a representation of the relative coverage of Australian, American
and Canadian media outlets on asylum policy, between 1980 and 2010.
Figure 2.1: Media Coverage of Asylum Policy in the United States, Australia, and
Canada (by Articles per Year).45

Note: This graph was borrowed from Rebecca Hamlin, “Let Me Be a Refugee:
Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in United States, Canada, and Australia”
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, 36. The data used to compile this graph was
collected from various sources by the author.
The exorbitant level of media attention that is placed on this phenomenon – seen
between 2001 and 2007 in particular – relative to other political issues is heightening the
sense of invasion felt by the average Australian, a sentiment that may not be well-founded.
Some of the news coverage that is given to IMAs has created various misconceptions, even
myths about the issue, related to the number of applications Australia receives, the quantity of
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boat arrivals, and the supposed illegality of their actions.46 The Scanlon report found that
most Australians are unaware of the actual numbers of arrivals but like Hamlin argues, the
media provides a “striking visual representation of a loss of border control.”47
Firmly related to both media saturation and domestic politics, the trend in public
opinion toward boat people has shown a steady hardening since the first arrivals in the 1970s,
when approximately sixty percent of those polled said that a ‘limited number’ of boat arrivals
should be allowed to stay, while close to a quarter wanted to ‘stop them from staying here,’
according to Betts.48 In both the research conducted in the 1970s and more recently, it is
noted that people who have attained higher education, especially those who have graduated
from university, are more receptive to an approach that allows asylum seekers to be resettled
in Australia. On the other hand, those who had achieved a secondary level of education or
lower were more restrictive in their opinions. Yet the overall attitude began to evolve and
when polling was conducted following the Tampa affair in 2001, the vast majority of people
not only approved of the Government’s actions but supported mandatory detention for all
boat arrivals.49 More recently, a poll conducted by UMR research found that sixty percent of
Australians were in support of harsher treatment for boat arrivals, and 59 percent of people
stated that boat people are not refugees, despite the evidence proving otherwise (see Table 2.3
above).50 This vast contrast between the general opinion of the Australian public, and the
veritable facts about boat people, seem to suggest that there is a cycle of misinformation in
the Australian media that is penetrating the Australian Government and their political
choices.
Boatloads of people arriving on Australian shores, unannounced, are indeed a very
visible breach of Australian border security and by extension the nation’s sovereignty, much
more so than the individuals slipping in unnoticed through airport gates. The Australian
media has coupled images of desperate asylum seekers arriving on often dilapidated vessels
in large groups with news coverage of a “war” against people smuggling activity and the
“illegal entry” of asylum seekers or “economic migrants.”51 The government has in turn used
the narrative of criminality and aggressive language to justify their policy objectives such as
excluding Christmas Island and other Australian territories from the migration zone, turning
46
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the boats around, instituting mandatory detention for all boat arrivals regardless of their
claims, and installing the Immigration Minister with the executive power to make the final
decision on asylum applications.52
Professor Sharon Pickering of Monash University stated the underlying issue well when she
said:
“There are a whole host of interlacing factors that have led us to believe this problem
is unique to Australia...Being a geographically isolated island nation and the idea we
are being invaded certainly feeds it. As does the fact that we have no strong humanrights discourse. We fill that void with law-and-order politics that frames the debate
around illegal refugees and a helpless sovereign state.”53
Precipitating Causes
1. Domestic and electoral politics:
The representative parliamentary nature of Australian politics lends politicians to be
judged by their ability to deal with an issue effectively, in this case an extremely polarizing
one. Despite the concerns of humanitarian advocacy agencies and intergovernmental
organizations like the UN, the Australian government has in recent years proven to be more
responsive to the border security rhetoric and anti-immigration fears of certain parts of the
Australian socio-economic strata than the welfare of asylum seekers, international law, or
their reputation abroad. This behavior is not going unnoticed: 78% of those surveyed in a July
2012 poll said that the politicians were “just playing politics” and were not genuinely
concerned about the welfare of asylum seekers.54 Yet recent public opinion polls indicate that
there is nevertheless considerable public support for the policy of turning back the boats, with
a 61% approval rating being measured by one poll.55 Nonetheless, the issue of boat people
has been decisive in the last several years; the last four Prime Ministers – John Howard,
Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, and Tony Abbott – have all incorporated boat people policy into
their election platforms and have equally been criticized for their handling of the issue.
Considering that there are federal elections every three years, it has been a constant talking
point in Australian politics, with every new development being hailed as the latest “scandal”
by the Australian media in the continued saga surrounding boat people.
2. Recent Events
The Terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 increased fear, racism and
xenophobia toward Muslims not just in Australia but around the world. With the Tampa
52
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affair occurring in the weeks prior, public opinion regarding Muslims was already
harshening, and these attitudes later manifested themselves in Australian policy in the form of
the Pacific Solution.56 Similarly, the emergence of the Islamic State organization in 2014 sent
shockwaves of fear all over the world, and Australia was not exempt, with the “Terror Alert”
being lifted to high, and the Australian Prime Minister stating "We do know that people
coming back from the Middle East, militarized and brutalized...do pose a significant threat to
our community.57 Furthermore, with the media’s tendency to sensationalize the connection
between terrorism and radical Islam, the public has grown to see the “war” against boat
people and people smugglers as directly related to “Security against jihadist violence from a
small but dangerous minority.”58 Thus politicians and media figures are capitalizing on
existing xenophobia and border insecurity to further their political goals, and demonizing
asylum seekers along the way.
3. Regional foreign policy
Australia’s relationship with its neighbors is necessarily a precipitating cause for the
current policy, given that it involves several partnerships, with Nauru, Papua New Guinea,
and Indonesia in particular. As the political and economic powerhouse in the immediate
region, Australia has sufficient political leverage and influence to allow the Government to
export the processing of asylum seekers in exchange for aid, and work with the Indonesian
government on strengthening the border protection of both states. However, these
relationships are not seamless, as will be discussed in more detail in the analysis below.
***
By breaking down what I believe to be the most critical causal factors in the
development of the present-day policy regarding boat people, it becomes clear that very few
of them are practically manageable for the Government. Namely, regulatory policy and
regional relationships are within the scope of active decision making, whereas people
smuggling networks, the link between media and public opinion, and the often fickle nature
of domestic politics is more difficult to grasp. Finally, the conditions that predispose refugee
flows, and formative events such as 9/11 are completely out of the control of policymakers.
By making these distinctions, I am suggesting that the Australians should focus on the
elements of the boat people phenomenon that are indeed manageable. Before I lay out my
policy proposal, I will first conduct a critical analysis of the policy that is in place today.

PART III: Critical Analysis of the Current Policy
In order to analyze the current policy in the most effective way possible, I will
deconstruct it into its component parts; Operation Sovereign Borders and Offshore
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Processing, previously known as the Pacific Solution, describing the key features of each
policy, identifying the specific violations of international law implicit in these measures, the
primary concerns of the international community, and conducting a cost-benefit analysis in
order to assess whether this course of action is indeed the most likely to be effective and
sustainable in the long term.
First introduced by the Howard Government in 2001, and then again in 2013 by the
Labor Party after a brief absence, the Pacific Solution is the policy that mandates the offshore
processing of boat arrivals, initially on the island of Nauru and then from 2013, on the Papua
New Guinean territory of Manus Island. A fumbled arrangement was proposed that would
have seen the extension of offshore processing to Malaysia, before the High Court ruled the
agreement unconstitutional.59 There are two major facets to this policy; the excision of
various ‘Migration Zones’ that lie off the Australian mainland, and the transfer of boat people
to a third party (the Nauruan and PNG governments), thus abdicating Australian jurisdiction
over the asylum seekers in question.60 The bilateral agreements are supported by
aforementioned Regional Resettlement Arrangements and Memorandums of Understanding,
and backed up by a promise that Australia will “bear all costs incurred” and make a
substantial increase in financial aid.61 The specific costs involved will be discussed in greater
detail in the cost-benefit analysis below. Most recently, an agreement to resettle refugees
currently living on Nauru in Cambodia has been signed, but its implementation appears to be
in jeopardy.62 Nevertheless, the Australian government is on a trajectory of widening the span
of its Pacific Solution to involve an increasing number of states in the region.
Operation Sovereign Borders, implemented in 2013 upon an election promise of the
Abbott campaign, initiated a significant reorganization of the departmental structures
involved in “stopping the boats,” the slogan often used by the Coalition in reference to their
policy objectives. Described as “a military-led, border security operation supported and
assisted by a wide range of federal government agencies,” OSB is headed by the Minister for
Immigration and the Lieutenant General (currently Angus Houston), who is also the
Commander of the Joint Agency Task Force (JATF).63 There are three key task groups
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involved in OSB, which engages several government departments and agencies including the
Australian Federal Police, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the
Defence Force – whose border protection role is one part of the broader “Operation Resolute”
– and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.64 Numerous affiliates are also
named as supporting agencies, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the
Australian Security Intelligence Organization. It has been reported that since the
commencement of OSB, numerous boats have been intercepted, and upwards of a dozen have
been turned back.65
Despite the perceived successes of the joint policies of offshore detention and strict
border protection activities in preventing and deterring the arrival of asylum seekers by boat
in Australia, many individuals and groups have raised concerns over the direction taken by
the Australian government in recent years. These complaints are sometimes made by refugee
advocates based on humanitarian concern for the welfare for asylum seekers, but the most
widespread outcry both within Australia and from the international relations community is
derived from the violations of international law that have been identified. The most pertinent
deviations from refugee norms found in the United Nations and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (1951, 1967) are as follows:
● One of the core principles of the UN Refugee Convention is non-penalization which
bars arbitrary detainment “purely on the basis of seeking asylum” a provision that the
Australian government has seemingly disregarded in its policy of universally
detaining all asylum seekers who arrive by boat, regardless of their refugee status.66
● By discriminating specifically against boat people because they have “illegally
entered” Australia’s sovereign borders and do not hold a valid visa, the Australian
government is violating the Convention’s Chapter V, Article 31 which states that
there should be no penalty for asylum seekers who have entered the state unlawfully
(as mandated by immigration law).67
● Australia’s compliance with the Convention is questionable regarding Fair Access to
Courts (Chapter II, Article 16), especially in light of the recent Bill passed in
December 2014 that only allows access to a hearing regarding refugee status in
exceptional circumstances.
● Chapter V, Article 32 states “The expulsion of such a refugee shall only be in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law.” Outside of
the RSD process that has already been described as perhaps inadequate in this regard,
64
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recent instances where the discretionary decision powers granted to the Minister for
Immigration have clearly undermined due process only further support the claim that
Australia is not complying with international law.68
● Article 33 of the same chapter concerns non-refoulement, considered the cornerstone
of international refugee law, and states that “No Contracting State shall expel or
return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”69 The latest
Bill gives the Minister for Immigration unchecked powers that potentially sabotage
this principle.
● Chapter V, Article 35 requests the cooperation of the national authorities with the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in ensuring
that the articles of the Convention are being carried out. The UNHCR is not a
signatory to the bilateral agreements with Nauru and PNG, and through numerous
reports, the agency has made clear their concerns regarding Australia’s compliance
with international law. One such report states: "In both Nauru and PNG the current
policies, operational approaches and harsh physical conditions at the centers...do not
meet international standards.”70
The International Bill of Human Rights, originating in 1948, also includes several
articles that apply to the current policy direction taken by the Australian government towards
boat people. More specifically, Article 5 states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” a precept that is elaborated upon by
the separate Convention on Torture and which a recent report from the United Nations itself
has questioned in regards to the conditions in Australia’s offshore detention centers. 71 Also
under scrutiny is Australia’s adherence to Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14.72 The UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child is another important consideration in this situation as it is not
uncommon for minors to accompany their parents on the arduous boat journey, and
subsequently join them for long stays in detention. A specific article in the Convention on the
68

For example, Minister for Immigration Scott Morrison denied protection to a Pakistani asylum seeker who
arrived by boat in 2012 on the basis of the national interest. This decision has recently been overturned by the
High Court, and the man has been granted a permanent protection visa. See: Sarah Whyte, "Scott Morrison
Loses High Court Case against a Refugee." The Sydney Morning Herald, February 11, 2015, Federal Politics.
69
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." UNHCR. December 1, 2010. 30
70
"UNHCR Reports Harsh Conditions and Legal Shortcomings." UNHCR. November 26, 2013.
71
“Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 217 (III). International Bill of Human Rights.” (Presented for
the United Nations General Assembly, Signed 10 December 1948). UN Documents: A/Res/3/217. A recent
report published by the UN has declared that Australia’s policy of third country processing violates the UN
Convention on torture due to the use of detention and the conditions on Manus Island in particular: "UN Report
to State Australia Is in Breach of International Torture Convention." The Age, March 9, 2015, Federal Politics.
72
Article 7 states that “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law.” The legal distinction being made between asylum seekers based on their mode of arrival
in Australia suggests that legal discrimination is occurring. Article 9 refers to freedom from arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile, 10 describes the right to a “fair and public hearing” for criminal charges and perhaps the
most fundamental in this case, number 14 expresses the right to “seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.”

“A Sustainable Solution” 22

Rights of the Child addresses the (arbitrary) detention of children, and several others relating
to rights to proper treatment and protection.73 The UNHCR, among other advocacy groups,
has raised questions over the treatment of children under the Pacific Solution, which will be
examined in greater depth in a moment.
Another area of international law that has become increasingly significant recently is
maritime law, with revelations surfacing that the Australian Navy is not only physically
turning boats full of would-be asylum seekers back to Indonesia, but crossing into Indonesian
waters several times in the process.74 These “incursions” have damaged Indo-Australian
relations and hints that the two governments are not necessarily on the same page as for how
to best manage illegal people smuggling and immigration activities taking place in the region.
Criticisms and concerns are being raised by an array of agencies and groups in respect
to numerous issues associated with the Australian government’s dealings with boat people,
from interceptions and turn-backs to the conditions in the processing centers. The three major
concerns voiced by the UNHCR are the use of offshore processing centers that effectively
impose arbitrary detention on boat people, the physical and psychological harm being
endured by asylum seekers in these centers, and the more recent practice of “pushing asylumseeker boats back at sea without a proper consideration of individual needs for protection.”75
Manus Island, the Papua New Guinean site for processing Australia-bound asylum seekers
has been at the center of the debate since its opening for an assortment of reasons, not the
least of which was the death of a detainee in February 2014 following several days of violent
protests.76 Moreover, the UNHCR is not a signatory to the bilateral agreement between
Australia and Papua New Guinea and would prefer that RSD take place on the mainland, and
the agency takes serious issue with “the combination of a tough physical environment,
restricted legal regime, and slow processing” which does not meet the required standards.77
Recent discussions for a prospective relocation deal with Cambodia have alarmed the
UNHCR, with the High Commissioner for Refugees arguing that “Refugees are persons who
73
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are fleeing persecution or the life-threatening effects of armed conflict. They are entitled to
better treatment than being shipped from one country to the next.”78
Organizations within Australia have also taken issue with some elements of third
country processing. The Australian Human Rights Commission, an independent statutory
body which regularly reports to the Australian Parliament, has named various causes for
concern, but the matter for which it has drawn the most attention is its stance on children in
detention. The recent report titled “The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in
Immigration Detention 2014” drew a storm of controversy with its findings that children who
are detained awaiting processing in Nauru are experiencing extremely high rates of
psychological disorders, exposure to sexual assault and violence, and engagement in self
harm.79 Other groups, like Amnesty International, the Refugee Action Coalition, and Human
Rights Watch, have all raised serious concerns over the mental wellbeing of detainees, with
anxiety, depression, and trauma common among the young male population at the Manus
Island center.80
Moreover, the legal community has asserted disapproval of the Government’s actions.
One such challenge concerns a group of Tamil asylum seekers whose boats were intercepted
in July 2014, with those on board being held on a customs vessel at sea for several weeks
while it was debated whether the asylum seekers would be handed over to Sri Lanka,
transferred to India, or brought onshore. As is the practice under the “enhanced screening
process,” Department of Immigration officials conducted a very brief on-board assessment of
refugee status without access to legal representation, which lawyers specializing in the area
have declared illegal.81 Fifty-three legal scholars signed a statement criticizing the absence of
any legal justification for the government’s actions.82 This is just one of a growing number of
legal challenges mounting in front of the government, as current and former detainees sue
over claims of mistreatment and wrongful imprisonment.83
The various humanitarian and legal problems surrounding Operation Sovereign
Borders are certainly troublesome, but a closer look at the relative costs and benefits of this
policy reveals that “stopping the boats” has come at an extraordinarily high price. Before
assessing the costs, both direct and indirect, I will discuss the assortment of benefits that the
Australian government under Abbott has reported since the rolling out of OSB. In terms of
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actual arrivals, there was a 90% reduction in the number of people who arrived in November
2012 compared to November 2013, and there has been just one boat arrival since the turnback policy was implemented in December 2013.84 That single instance, which occurred in
July 2014, was a noticeable blip, however; the case of the aforementioned Tamil asylum
seekers was taken to the High Court of Australia. 85 Despite the hiccup, current Immigration
Minister Peter Dutton declared that “OSB and our turnback policy has restored the integrity
of our borders.”86 There are also indications that the message has been communicated to the
beginning of the pipeline, with the volume of asylum seekers travelling to Indonesia in order
to seek assistance in their journey onwards falling, and many of those that remain accepting
that Australia has “closed the way, that you won’t take us if we come by boat.” 87 The number
of people registering with the UNHCR in Indonesia has dropped dramatically, and the vast
majority of those who do are attending their second interview, an indication that the asylum
seekers are not attempting to take the illegal route via boat to Australia.88 The people
smuggling network has also had to adjust their approach in response to the tightening of the
borders to boat people, lowering the price for a spot on a boat and seeking alternative routes
to Australia; New Zealand is now being advertised as a more viable destination.89
Furthermore, the number of asylum seekers waiting to be processed is in decline; without
hope for resettlement in Australia, some are opting to return home voluntarily, for a price.90
One line of rhetoric used by the Australian government is that by physically and
politically stopping the boats, this policy is also saving lives. Between 2000 and 2014, there
were at least 1969 deaths of asylum seekers, with all but 59 of them occurring at sea as a
result of vessel related trouble.91 There has been a marked decrease in capsize and drowning
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incidents since Operation Sovereign Borders was implemented, however I argue that the
claim of “saving lives,” may be oversimplifying the complexities of the broader asylum
seeker and refugee problem. Finally, the policy has been politically advantageous for the
Government, specifically the Coalition who were at the helm of OSB’s enactment. While
approval of Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s performance has been mixed since he took office
in September 2013, polling has shown consistent support for the restrictive stance on boat
people with 48% approval of Operation Sovereign Borders in December 2013.92 A Lowy
Institute Poll published in June 2014 makes clear that the present policy has a solid backing
from the Australian public; 71% surveyed stated that they supported turning boats around
when safe and 59% agree with offshore processing.93 Having the apparent support of the
public is certainly politically beneficial for the proponents of Operation Sovereign Borders
and the Pacific Solution.
From several angles, it therefore appears that the combination of at-sea interdiction
and turn around, third-country processing, and the removal of any chance for resettlement in
Australia by the last two Prime Ministers has had a drastic influence; effectively halting boat
arrivals (bar one) in the last fifteen months. Although I do not agree that the fundamental goal
of the policy regarding boat people should be as simple as stopping the boats, the Australian
government has made a strong statement with a “visible deterrent to people smugglers,” but
at what cost? 94
Costs can be broken down into two categories; those pertaining to the financial
burden of a policy, and those incurred by other interests and values, such as Australian ideals
and democracy. I will begin the analysis by discussing the non-monetary or indirect costs of
the Government’s boat people policy. First, there is a political cost inherent in some of the
mechanics of this program, both domestically and internationally. The Australian political
landscape has been severely polarized by the boat people issue, with a wide and ever-growing
separation between the major parties and their mission to effectively “stop the boats” and the
dissenting calls of a small but strong opposition who believe in a more compassionate
approach.
Australia’s regional relationships have also been somewhat marred by the Pacific
Solution. Despite acting as co-partners in their efforts to dismantle people smuggling
operations, Australian-Indonesian relations have been hurt by several instances where the
Australians have overstepped their bounds. On the back of phone-tapping revelations in late
2013, it became apparent in 2014 that Australian naval forces had “inadvertently” crossed
into Indonesian waters in order to turn boats carrying asylum seekers around.95 Not only was
92

"Approval of Tony Abbott." Essential Vision. March 10, 2015, and Doering Curtis, Katherine. "A Tale of
Two Countries: Comparing Recent Developments in Australian and American Immigration Policy." Campbell
Law Observer, March 11, 2014.
93
Oliver, Alex. "Lowy Institute Poll 2014." Lowy Institute for International Policy. June 2, 2014.
94
“Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
and the Government of Australia,” 2013.
95
Bachelard, Michael. "Tony Abbott's Asylum Seeker Policies 'Offensive', Says Senior Indonesian Politician."
The Sydney Morning Herald, September 19, 2013, Federal Politics sec.

“A Sustainable Solution” 26

this interpreted by Indonesia as a violation of sovereignty, but an insult to the efforts being
made for a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Indonesian foreign minister
Marty Natalegawa has stated that “Indonesia rejects Australia's policy to turn back the boats
because such a policy is not actually conducive to a comprehensive solution."96 While the
Australian government has apologized for the accidental crossings, it is clear that Indonesia
has not taken this situation lightly, putting additional strain on an already shaky alliance.
Recent events unrelated to the people smuggling and boat people issue seem to be further
corroding relations, yet the extent to which tensions will cripple cooperative efforts in this
policy area is unclear.97
Aside from Indonesia, there are political and social costs for the states recruited to be
the sites of third-country processing; Nauru and Papua New Guinea. In exchange for aid
packages, these relatively small states have agreed to process the claims of boat people and
ultimately resettle those found to be genuine refugees. This is not a flawless transition
however, and some reports claim that infrastructure and services are inadequate in Nauru, and
there are fears of violence from the Papua New Guinean community upon the release of
detained refugees.98 By taking this particular policy track, the Australian government is not
only expanding the reach of this boat people predicament, but creating costs for several other
states in the region, something that would be unnecessary if the process was kept onshore.
At the root of refugee politics is a humanitarian issue. The United Nations devised the
Convention on the Status of Refugees as a result of an international concern for people who
have been displaced by war, political instability, and persecution. Yet the effects of the
current policy on those whose interests are supposedly at the forefront of the relevant
international law are being ignored. The human costs of offshore processing and OSB include
abandoning those that are turned around at sea, hence leaving them with no resolution of their
claim or rights in Indonesia, with those who are detained often suffering through
indeterminate lengths of time in conditions that have been abhorred by the UN. The most
serious concerns are those relating to the mental health of children who are detained; 85%
reported being negatively affected in some way. 99 While waiting for their claim to be
processed, many asylum seekers experience the deterioration of their physical and mental
health, and for those who are rejected, these people may face persecution or torture upon their
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return. In some cases returnees have even been murdered, a testament to the blatant shortfalls
of the current processing system.100
Although probably the most difficult to assess, the harsh political maneuvers made by
this government have potential (and real) consequences for Australia’s international standing.
The extensive breaches of international law are widely known by foreign governments and
may affect Australia’s ability to be influential in its partnerships and in the multilateral
forums. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees publicly criticized Australia’s boat people
policy at the UNHCR-NGO consultations in Geneva in June 2014, with one observer stating
that “Australia is being seen for what it is – a country that has manufactured a border
protection crisis to justify turning its back on people seeking its help.”101 In addition, some
political commentators have claimed that there is a cost to democracy in that the specifics of
the policy, such as the precise numbers of asylum seekers or incidents at sea, and the internal
conditions at the offshore centers are censored by the Australian government. This lack of
transparency encourages ignorance in the general public, and undermines the government’s
accountability.102 The Australian Prime Minister has stated that "We are in a fierce contest
with these people smugglers [and] if we were at war, we wouldn't be giving out information
that is of use to the enemy” in response to criticism regarding the secrecy of Operation
Sovereign Borders.103 Nonetheless, there are numerous costs – political, human, and social –
that are brought about by the policy and must be accounted for in the analysis.
The total direct monetary cost of this policy is difficult to ascertain due to the
complexity of its implementation. As already mentioned, several government departments
and agencies are involved, there are distinct naval activities known collectively as Operation
Resolute that must be accounted for, as well as bipartisan agreements with Nauru and Papua
New Guinea that designate compensation. In order to make the various subdivisions and their
costs more clear, I have constructed the following table, which can be interpreted as a firm
estimate of the economic burden of the policy, but is by no means the full picture.
Department or
Agency / Purpose
Offshore Processing
Centre in Papua New

100

Description
● Operating Costs: center construction and
maintenance

Cost
$1.1 billion over 4
years (2013-17)

As already noted above, there have been several instances of suicide or attempted suicide, and detainees
frequently go on hunger strikes and self-harm.
See: "Australian Border Deaths Database," 2014 and Gordon and Whyte, "Frustration Grows among Asylum
Seekers as PNG Yet to Offer Resettlement,” 2014
101
"UN Criticises Australia's 'Strange Obsession with Boats'" Pro Bono Australia. June 18, 2014.
102
Reilly, Alex. “The Boats May Have Stopped, but at What Cost to Australia?” The Conversation. August 27,
2014. For example, when the 157 Tamil asylum seekers were intercepted and placed on a customs vessel for
several weeks, the government did not make the situation known to the public until they were pressed to by
some members of the media.
103
Davies, Sarah, and Phil Orchard. "Halting Migrant Boats: Lessons from Australia - CNN.com." CNN. April
24, 2014.

“A Sustainable Solution” 28

Guinea
(Manus Island)104

Offshore Processing
Centre in Nauru105

Offshore Processing
Total 2014-15

●
●
●
●

Centre Service Provider Contracts
Refugee Status Determination
Community Assistance Support (CAS)
Additional Aid

●
●
●
●
●

Operational Costs
Centre Service Provider Contracts
Refugee Status Determination
Support for community-based arrangements
Aid

As indicated by the 2014-15 Budget

$420 million (201415)
$1.9 billion over 4
years (2012-16)
$27 million
(2014-15)
$826.1 million106

Relocation
Agreement with
Cambodia107

Australia promised Cambodia $40 million over
four years in additional aid as a condition of a
bilateral agreement between the two
governments for the proposed relocation of up to
1,000 refugees from Nauru.

$40 million over 4
years (2014-18)

Operation Resolute108
(Dept. of Defence)

Dealing with IMAs is just one part of this
Operation that encompasses a number of
objectives, thus the specific cost of intercepting
boats and the actions that follow is difficult to
pinpoint.

$9.9 - 262 million
(per year)109

Australian Customs

The activities conducted by this agency are

$265.8 million
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and Border Protection diverse but spokespeople for Customs have
Service110
acknowledged that IMAs are the responsible for
the majority of agency assets, and $3.7 million
has been specifically allocated for preventing
and disrupting maritime people smuggling, with
posts in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.111
Dept. of Immigration
and Border Protection

● Regional Cooperation Program 112
● Christmas Island: Rapid transfer to OPCs 113
● Education for school-aged children
● Compliance, removal and network
management reforms for “legacy
caseload”114
115

● Detention and Status Resolution

(2014-15 budget
estimate)

$94 million (201415)
$217.6 million over
5 years
$2.6 million
$149.9 million

$638 million
(2014-15)

Dept. of Social
Services

Support services for boat people found to be
owed protection (in the form of a Temporary
Protection or Bridging Visa)

$85.2 million
(2014-15)116

Dept. of Foreign
Affairs and Trade

Anti-people smuggling operations

$6.4 million over 2
years117

Approximate Total
for 2014-15

Offshore processing for Irregular Maritime
Arrivals and Operation Sovereign Borders

$2.82 billion

Important to note is that in order to offset the additional aid to Papua New Guinea as
indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding, and to secure their cooperation in
processing the claims of boat people, the Australian government has reduced the overall
international aid contribution to $5 billion for 2014-15, representing 0.32% of Australia’s
GNI (gross national income), significantly lower than the 0.7% recommended by the United
110
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Nations.118 Finally, these cost projections do not include some of the expenses (particularly
administrative) that are associated with refugee and humanitarian assistance as there is no
clear distinction between services provided for refugees who have been given placements
under the Humanitarian Programme or those arriving without a valid visa on a boat. There are
also miscellaneous costs associated with OSB that are not budgeted for, including a supposed
12 million dollar price tag for the holding of a large group of Tamil asylum seekers on a
Customs vessel in Australian waters for four weeks in July 2014.119
Before moving onto my development of an alternative policy, I will use the following
three questions to evaluate the appropriateness of offshore processing (the Pacific Solution)
and Operation Sovereign Borders: Is it legitimate? Is it feasible? Is it effective? To address
the first question, I have discussed in some detail the numerous issues that have been raised
surrounding the legitimacy of this approach in terms of international law and human rights.
Yet it must be stated that in relation to Australian domestic politics, the policy itself is
legitimate in that is was approved by the Parliament and has the backing of the majority of
the Australian public. However, whether it is truly legitimate in the context of Australian
values, such as multiculturalism and giving people “a fair go” is questionable. As for
feasibility, OSB has been in place for close to 18 months so it is clearly feasible in the current
context. Notwithstanding, my analysis of the costs of the policy raise the question as to
whether it is a long-term solution for the pipeline of asylum seekers who will continue to try
to gain protection in Australia. While it may be feasible in the current circumstances, the
situation external to Australia may change, and by extension, so will the degree of feasibility.
There is no doubt that the combination of offshore processing, third-country resettlement for
boat arrivals, and at-sea interdiction has been effective as a deterrent for people smuggling in
the region and halting the arrival of boats since its implementation. Nevertheless, it is my
argument that the narrow goal of the Australian government concerning boat people is not in
fact the appropriate objective, and the following section shall demonstrate that an alternative
plan may reap more benefits at a substantially lower cost to both the asylum seekers and the
Australian government.

PART IV: Toward a more sustainable solution
Having deconstructed the issue of boat people and both the advantages and difficulties
associated with the ongoing use of offshore processing coupled with maritime intervention, I
hope to arrive at a strong alternative policy in the conclusion of this section. To do so, I will
reestablish my fundamental goal, provide evaluation criteria for an appropriate policy,
explore the alternative, and ultimately come to a conclusion about the likelihood of it being
an effective and sustainable policy in the current Australian social, economic, and political
climate.
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First, I must reiterate the principle goal with which I am working:
Irregular Maritime Arrivals are processed in accordance with our obligations to
international law regarding refugees and human rights, and those found to be legitimate
refugees are permanently resettled in Australia.
This goal can be broken down into several clear policy objectives that will drive the
policymaking process and are within the scope of the Australian government (See Part II –
Levels of Causality above).
1. Boat arrivals are transferred to onshore processing centers
2. The Refugee Status Determination Procedure adheres to relevant international law,
including the right to a fair and timely trial, without discrimination for method of
arrival
3. The conditions at the processing centers comply with human rights law
4. Those determined to be legitimate refugees as per the Refugee Convention are
granted permanent protection visas and resettled in Australia
5. The Australian government fully cooperates with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and makes available all relevant information.
With the policy goal and objectives in mind, it is possible to develop a set of
evaluation criteria that can be used to assess a policy alternative. Taking from Bardach, I will
use four general criteria to assess the potential of the proposed policy: technical feasibility,
political viability, financial possibility, and administrative operability.120 Note that these
criteria are more specific than the three questions asked of the existing policy; this is due to
the circumspective nature of a policy proposal compared with the analysis of a policy that is
already in place. Simply put, if this alternative solution is to be truly viable, more questions
need to be asked.
I will now elaborate on what each of these specifically signify in the case of asylum
seeker policy in Australia. Technical feasibility is relatively straightforward as it asks the
basic question of effectiveness. To what extent will the policy achieve the purpose outlined in
the goal? In this case, will the policy ensure that Australia meets its obligations in a general
sense, as well as achieving the five objectives listed above? However, as I will be assessing
the effectiveness of a policy that has not yet been implemented, it will be a prediction that
may or may not be fully accurate in particular circumstances. Political viability is more
complex; not only does the policy need to be broadly acceptable to the political parties in
order for legislation to be successful in Parliament, but there must be general support from
the Australian public, with the cost/benefit balance being favorable for the key groups most
impacted by the decisions made. For this criterion to be met, concessions may need to be
considered to gain the required political backing, yet without sacrificing the core mission of
the policy. Again, this will be a speculative assessment, but with adequate information and
understanding, I will be able to make an educated guess. Financial possibility is related to the
120
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cost/benefit analysis, yet in this case I will make a general estimate of the economic costs
involved, keeping in mind the approximate expenditures resulting from offshore processing
and OSB noted above as a reference. I will also briefly summarize the anticipated benefits for
the Government, the asylum seekers in question, and the Australian public. Finally,
administrative operability concerns whether the policy can be implemented in the given
context; are the institutional features available to carry out the policy? All four of these
evaluation criteria, and the preceding objectives, will be utilized in the following discussion
of an alternative practice to the handling of boat people and their claims for refugee status in
Australia.
My proposal draws from both the existing framework in Australia and practices
utilized by other states in similar contexts. I will first provide an overview of the plan,
discussing how each component relates to the goal and objectives, conduct a cost benefit
analysis and assess the policy against the aforementioned evaluation criteria. With that in
mind, a policy that is both viable and sustainable would consist of three fundamental tenets:
short-term onshore processing, community processing, and a transformed RSD regime. For
the purpose of initial assessment, the current onshore processing centers can be expanded,
and in some cases reopened, to act as ‘reception centers’ for asylum seekers regardless of
their mode of travel, or whether they applied for refugee status from within Australia or
externally.121 As currently seen in several countries, the reception centers would function as a
temporary residence of transition for refugee applicants with a clear end date (potentially
mandated by law), after which a decision on refugee status must be made or the applicant
must be transferred to a community-based facility; I will go into more detail regarding the
specific requirements of RSD shortly. An independent monitory body would be charged with
ensuring that conditions meet international standards, and the Australian government would
fully cooperate with the UNHCR, allowing access and assessment of the facilities when upon
request.
Following a screening for underlying issues that may forgo their placement, those
found to meet the base criteria for protection under the Refugee Convention will have their
claims expedited and moved into community processing on a ‘Bridging Visa,’ of which the
purpose is to facilitate the successful integration of the refugees into Australian life, through
community engagement programs, employment placement, education in English and
vocational training and access to health and basic services; an all-round more comprehensive
approach than is currently provided for those who have been placed in community
processing/detention at the discretion of the immigration minister.122 Each individual/family
would be provided an allowance for living expenses and assigned a case officer responsible
for managing the refugee application, easing the transition into life in Australia, and
ultimately helping the refugees gain independence and become contributing members of
121
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society. There would necessarily be compliance requirements for community processing and
this system would require an expansion of the supporting infrastructure, but as the costbenefit analysis below will demonstrate, the long-term benefits of this approach that have
been observed in several states will override any initial costs incurred for creating the means
to carry out the policy.
The third component acts as an umbrella policy governing both of the processing
contexts. It is imperative that a durable and legitimate solution incorporates a Refugee Status
Determination regime that is compliant with international law, emphasizes procedural justice,
and is sufficiently transparent to ensure the integrity of the system. Key requirements would
include a completely independent body that investigates and hears the applicant’s claim, with
universal access to legal assistance and translation services, and the right to appeal, a
significant move away from the limited assessment that is afforded to boat people
currently.123 There would also be automatic and periodic judicial review of the decision to
guarantee transparency and accountability on the part of the Government and the courts.
The following analysis is a broad overview of the costs and benefits of this alternative
policy, as they relate to three key areas: financial or Government budgetary costs, human
costs and considerations, and other notable factors that may amount either directly or
indirectly from this policy. I will also note the key advantages and drawbacks of communitycentric RSD as compared with the offshore processing system described in Part III. In order
to serve the needs of Irregular Maritime Arrivals, the existing onshore detention and
processing infrastructure must be expanded. There are currently five core Immigration
Detention Centers (IDCs) on the Mainland and Christmas Island, but there is potential for
reopening the recently closed Curtin IDC if necessary.124 In addition, the current
infrastructure that may be utilized included three Immigration Transit Accommodation (ITA)
facilities that may be used as temporary housing until a Bridging visa is granted and a
placement in independent community accommodation becomes available, and two sites
allocated for Immigration Residential Housing (IRH), as well as various rental
accommodations made available to those who have been cleared to live in the community.125
Based on the current statistics, it is highly likely that the ITA and IRH framework would
require extension, but by working with community, not-for-profit, and church organizations
who are strong advocates of community processing, the costs could be kept modest.126
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Additional costs that come under the financial or budgetary category include
programs such as the Asylum Seeker Assistance Scheme, Community Assistance Support,
the Application Assistance Scheme, compliance resolution, support systems for
unaccompanied minors, and contracts with organizations that provide services including
health care.127 Overall, the budget for the onshore management of Irregular Maritime Arrivals
in 2014-15 was estimated at totaling $1.85 billion, with significant reductions projected for
the next several years.128 This represents close to a decrease of one billion dollars, or 35% of
the projected costs of offshore processing and its related policies for 2014-15. However, if
this policy were to be implemented and hence replace offshore processing for boat arrivals, a
portion of the newly freed-up capital could be reallocated to developing and strengthening the
community processing infrastructure and programs and providing training for the employees
that are charged with carrying out the elements of the program. To further demonstrate the
fiscal benefits of an onshore/community processing scheme, the Australian Human Rights
Commission has estimated that the Community Assistance Scheme costs $38 per day for
asylum seekers living in the community, but $125 for those in immigration detention, and on
a larger scale, community detention is cited as costing just $100,000 per annum, 25% of the
total cost that offshore detention incurs for every asylum seeker.129 Thus, there are fewer
costs for both onshore and community processing options, and the economic contribution that
refugees can make by working and spending in the community, as well as the jobs created by
moving the industry within Australia is good news for the national economy. In sum,
reducing time in detention, or avoiding it altogether, will inherently lead to financial savings.
As with most policy discussions, there is a human factor to be considered; how will
the policy impact those individuals whose interests are directly related to the decision? As I
detailed in Part III, prolonged detention of asylum seekers often induces negative effects for
their health, particular psychological. I argue that moving the processing onshore, and
shortening the average stay to six months or less – as opposed to the current average of 394
days – would bring marked improvements for the welfare of asylum seekers and refugees.130
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There is compelling testimonial evidence to support this claim, as asylum seekers moved to a
community setting expressed feelings of relief, lowered anxiety regarding the status of their
claim, and a return to normalcy.131 Community setups impose fewer restrictions on the liberty
of the individual, provides community engagement and a strong support network, and for
some, the opportunity to attain paid employment. A report published by the International
Detention Coalition argues that the use of community management means that “Damaging
experiences particular to detention, including confinement, a sense of gross injustice, broken
relationships and isolation from society” are likely to be avoided.132 However, the Human
Rights Commission noted that the transition was smoother for those who had only
experienced detention for several months or less, while those who had been in a situation of
indefinite detention for an extended period complained of continued trauma associated with
their detainment.133 The asylum seekers interviewed by the Commission stressed the
importance of having a routine, and their desire of making a contribution to Australia (i.e.
through work), to learn English and to develop community relationships. The current
parameters for community detention do not allow paid employment, a privilege reserved for
those holding Bridging Visas. In my opinion, it is essential that an alternative policy allows
all those transferred out of onshore to detention, who possess the skills and adequate
language training to gain paid employment, to do so.134 Fundamental to the policy is the
recognition that the vast majority of boat arrivals are in fact, legitimate refugees who are
entitled to a supported transition to life in Australia.
Other considerations that should be noted are prospective costs and benefits that may
arise from this alternative policy, but do not fall into the categories of financial or human
factors. These include impacts on Australia’s reputation and core values including
democracy, fairness, and diversity. Instituting a policy consisting of the elements described
above would comply with international law and standards regarding the treatment and
processing of asylum seekers and refugees, and reaffirm Australia as a nation that values
human rights and justice. In addition, Australia would be seen as making a responsible
contribution to the global refugee problem that shows no signs of abating. Furthermore, by
moving the RSD process for boat people onshore, the system is rendered more transparent
which supports a stronger Australian democracy, and the removal of constraints and
punishments specific to IMAs secures an approach that is in line with international law,
justice and quite simply, the Australian notion of ‘a fair go.’ Another important Australian
value as mentioned in the introduction is multiculturalism and diversity. Asylum seekers and
refugees are seeking to contribute to and integrate with Australian society, and subsequently
everyone benefits from the increased richness in the social fabric of the country. One
foreseeable drawback of a more inclusive and compassionate policy may be an increase in the
number of people attempting to reach Australia by boat, but by strengthening the efforts to
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eradicate the people smuggling industry in Indonesia, by offering more places annually for
the Humanitarian Program (asylum applications from outside Australia) and by continuing to
monitor the waters between South-East Asia and Australia in order to prevent tragedy, I
argue that the blowback of the policy change can be mitigated.
There is considerable support for a community-based refugee processing arrangement
in Australia, from community and church organizations, human rights advocates, policy
experts and not-for-profits specializing in a number of fields. The Australian Council for
Social Services states: “It is misguided to be looking at off-shore solutions when the most
effective, economical, and humane method for processing asylum seekers is right here on our
doorstep.”135 Amnesty International echoed this by agreeing that “Community processing
initiatives…are much cheaper than detention, and much more humane, giving asylum seekers
the chance to start contributing to Australian society while they wait for their refugee status
to be assessed.”136 An article published in the Forced Migration Review similarly found that
“community arrangements…comprise a far a more human and effective model than closed
detention,” and the United Nations has been a consistent proponent of an RSD process based
on the Australian mainland, and one that adheres to international law.137
While an assessment of community processing may be premature or speculative in the
Australian context, there are several prominent case studies that demonstrate that a similar
system has not only worked but been highly successful in transforming the phenomenon of
asylum seeking from an issue of illegal entry to a positive story of integration and
contribution. A report entitled “There are Alternatives” published by the International
Detention Coalition and the La Trobe Refugee Research Center, both based in Melbourne,
Australia conducts an in-depth analysis of methods used in numerous states around the world
and presents a decision-making model for asylum policy.138 Four pertinent case studies from
which we borrow elements that are appropriate to the Australian context are New Zealand,
Spain, Sweden and Canada.
New Zealand takes an approach that focuses on the individual circumstances of each
person, with a tiered detention and monitoring system that emphasizes the use of reporting
and other requirements rather than opting for secure detention. The asylum seeker is expected
to report to an immigration officer and/or appear at a refugee tribunal, and failure to do so
may result in arrest and detention.139 This could be applied in Australia using the existing
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infrastructure, and by identifying vulnerable individuals and others who are suitable for
community processing early on, not only are costs lowered but the welfare of the asylum
seekers is prioritized. Spain is an example of a country that places critical importance on the
treatment of asylum seekers and their rights; reception centers operated by both the
government and affiliated organizations accommodate asylum seekers for up to six months,
with an assigned social worker and assistance to gain employment and housing, access to the
same level of health care as Spanish citizens, mandatory Spanish language and culture
classes, and legal assistance. Those housed in the reception centers are given a basic
allowance and allowed to come and go, and if a decision has not been made regarding their
claim within six months, there is the ability to apply for a further six months.140 I do not
anticipate Australia’s processing centers advancing to this extent in the near future, but the
Immigration Transit Accommodation (ITA) centers, currently used to house people before
they are granted a Bridging Visa, could be molded to this framework that promotes
integration of refugees and asylum seekers, and has been commended by the UNHCR. As a
country that receives a large influx of asylum seekers through various mechanisms including
by boat, Spain serves as a model for the value of an inclusive and supportive RSD process.
Like Spain, Sweden has a ‘reception program,’ lasting one week primarily for the
purpose of required government checks, before placement in an open community housing
setting. Basic needs in terms of food, health care, and legal advice are provided and asylum
seekers are given the right to work and contribute to their living costs while a case worker
helps them to navigate their case for protection.141 The ability to work was previously
touched on as an essential element of a policy that values the desire of refugees to make a
livelihood as well as contribute to their country of asylum in a meaningful way. Finally, if the
outcome is negative, Sweden offers the applicant two months to leave voluntarily, leading to
higher rates of wilful return and a less costly result for the government. As the CAP model
suggests (see footnote 130), detention is used only in a situation of last resort, when an
individual is preparing to be deported from the country. This is an underrated but important
aspect of asylum policy where Australia should aim to eventually succeed in the future. In
addition to a relatively high intake of refugees through their humanitarian program, a notable
feature of Canada’s internal system is its use of negative financial consequences for
encouraging compliance with the conditions of community processing. For example, bail
may be used as a condition for release from detention awaiting a hearing, and a bond may be
enforced as a mechanism for compelling cooperation with the conditions of release, a method
that is relatively inexpensive when compared to detention, and has proved successful with a
96% compliance rate.142

140

Sampson et al, “There are Alternatives,” The International Detention Coalition, 2011: 34
Ibid 35
142
Ibid 44 and "The Refugee System in Canada." Government of Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada,
Communications Branch. March 4, 2015. Canada’s humanitarian resettlement program should be commended
for its effort to resettle high numbers of refugees from regions of high application rates, such as Bhutan and Iraq,
with a commitment to resettle more than 6,000 and 20,000 refugees from these countries respectively (as of late
2014).
141

“A Sustainable Solution” 38

Australia’s existing intensive case resolution system for onshore asylum seekers has
been praised for its thorough approach, especially concerning highly vulnerable individuals,
for whom a specific program has been created (Community Assistance Support Program). If
this framework could be broadened to include all asylum seekers, including boat arrivals, and
the Government could make the necessary changes to render the policy overall more
supportive and inclusive, while remaining legitimate and effective as other countries have
done, Australia would be much closer to achieving the goal I outlined earlier.143 Lastly, it
should be reaffirmed that community processing of asylum seekers boasts a consistently high
compliance rate, whether financial or other such consequences are used to encourage
cooperation or not. The study conducted by the International Detention Coalition found that
compliance rates range from 80% to 99.9% in some cases, thus demonstrating an intrinsic
benefit of this approach; asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to cooperate with the
government when their rights as asylum seekers or refugees have been secured.144
Having described the key tenets of the policy, broken down some of the more
pertinent costs and benefits, and summarized the successes of similar community-centric
policy approaches in other countries, I will now broadly assess this policy proposal against
the four evaluation criteria mentioned at the beginning of this section. The criterion of
technical feasibility relates to the broad question of ‘is it effective?’ and when this policy is
measured against the goal and specific objectives outlined above, it can be defined as an
effective policy in principle; the process meets Australia’s obligations under international
human rights and refugee law, as concerning onshore processing – with active monitoring to
certify that the conditions meet UNHCR requirements – an RSD regime that prioritizes the
individual circumstances of each applicant, with regular judicial review, the use of temporary
community processing that assures the wellbeing of asylum seekers, and eventual
resettlement on the Australian mainland for those whose claims are established to be
sufficient for refugee status and permanent protection. In theory, these fundamental elements
combine to offer a policy that effectively achieves the underlying goal. Political viability is
more difficult to predict, but seeing as there is already considerable support in Australia for
community processing, spearheaded by the Greens Party and numerous other organizations, I
argue that the core requirement for making the policy viable to both the major parties and the
Australian public is to emphasize the considerable economic benefits associated with this
alternative as compared to the significant burden imposed by offshore processing and
Operation Sovereign Borders.145 There is a possibility that some concessions may need to be
granted, such as removing the legally mandated time limit for processing in the onshore
detention centers from the policy draft, but I contend that by changing the narrative of asylum
seekers and refugees, especially boat people, the Australian government can initiate a policy
similar to this one that is outlined on these pages.
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Also speculative to an extent, financial possibility is one component of the costbenefit analysis conducted earlier. Based on estimates taken from other countries and made
by Australian commentators, it can be assumed with a degree of certainty that a policy that
incorporates minimizing time in detention and maximizing the use of community processing
is much less expensive than the extensive costs associated with offshore processing and OSB
that is pushing $3 billion, some of which are not on public record. Given that upon
implementation of this policy, offshore processing could be dismantled, and an onshore
system would both utilize existing infrastructure and provide economic stimulus, there is
clear and abundant financial possibility for this program. The final criterion is administrative
operability, and recognizing that while the current onshore detention centers may need to be
expanded or upgraded, and additional housing located for community processing, the core
features such as trained staff and an RSD review board are already in place and active. With
some reorganizing, hiring of supplemental staff, and changes made to make the Refugee
Review Tribunal more independent and focused on procedural justice, the policy could be
begin to roll out in the very near future, although there would need to be an allowance for a
transition phase. All things considered, I consider the biggest challenge for the
implementation of this policy to be making it politically viable in the eyes of the major
parties and the Australian public.

Part V: Conclusion
Australia, like the United States, is fundamentally a nation of immigrants, more
specifically, of ‘boat people.’ From the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788, to the mass
migrations spurred by the Second World War, people have been arriving in Australia via a
naval route for over two centuries. Evidently, the boat people I am talking about here are of a
slightly different origin, in that the vast majority of them are fleeing persecution or the
horrors of state breakdown and war, not migrating out of choice or for some economic
incentive. The underlying question I am presenting is why treat these asylum seekers any
differently to those who apply for protection from outside Australia, or those who travel by
air and subsequently apply from within the country? Boat people are owed the same human
rights as all of us, in addition to specific rights that are granted to refugees under the UN
Refugee Convention.
In spite of this inequality and discrimination, the current policy combination of active
boat interception and turn-around, offshore processing, and third-country resettlement is in
blatant violation of a number of international laws pertaining to refugees, including arbitrary
detention, non-penalization, and due process of law (See Part III). The conditions within the
offshore processing centers have been widely condemned as being well below the standard
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, has repeatedly
expressed his concern about the restrictive policies; “Refugees are persons who are fleeing
persecution or the life-threatening effects of armed conflict. They are entitled to better
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treatment than being shipped from one country to the next."146 Despite these criticisms, the
Australian government remained resolute in their conviction that offshore processing among
the other measures was within their lawful mandate when Operation Sovereign Borders went
into effect in late 2013. The policy has been hailed a success by the leadership as since its
implementation, there has just been just one incident of a boat breaching Australian borders.
Success, however, is relative to the stated goal. The only goal that has been publicized by the
Australian government in regards to boat people is simply “stopping the boats,” with the
single commendable justification being that inhibiting the people smuggling trade and the
passage of unseaworthy vessels between Indonesia and Australia has saved lives.147
I have argued throughout this paper that this narrow goal is not a sufficient response
to a complex issue that spans the entire region. It must be reiterated however that the current
refugee crisis is a global phenomenon: since the UNHCR was established to address the
predicament of one million refugees and displaced people following the Second World War,
there is now over 42 million people that are noted as being of concern to the United Nations,
of which upwards of 11 million are determined to be refugees.148 Recent events in the
Mediterranean which saw over 700 asylum seekers drown when attempting to reach Italy
from Libya, have also brought into focus the extent of the boat people problem in Europe,
and some have questioned whether the “Australian Solution” could be a viable response. At
closer inspection, the Australian government’s means of stopping the boats is not feasible in
the European context.149 Consequently, I argue that a policy that seemingly ignores the global
scope of the issue and its implications abroad is not a sustainable approach to solving a
problem that does in fact, extend beyond Australia’s borders.
The Australian boat people predicament is just one instance in a larger conflict
between domestic government policies and the more recent institution of international law
that almost all states continue to grapple with across a number of issues. Yet as a nation with
the capacity to respond to the flow of asylum seekers in a way that respects both international
law and our prominent political and economic influence in the region, I argue that the
Australian government should move away from a policy of deterrence to one that focuses on
establishing a Refugee Status Determination procedure that fulfills our obligations and brings
integrity to the Government, rather than being a source of national shame. Developed nations
need to remove the burden from the shoulders of less developed states that lack the means
and infrastructure to manage the overwhelming numbers of refugees on their doorsteps.
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Australia could also make some active and positive progress within the scope of its
regional relationships. I went into some detail regarding the current state of Australia’s
regional partnerships, with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Nauru in particular in Parts II
and III, but the policy goal and outline that I put forward does not include an answer to what I
outlined as a secondary goal; a regionally-agreed approach combating illegal people
smuggling activity. This is an area where I strongly suggest further research be conducted, as
domestic policy alone cannot manage the pipeline of asylum seekers that is continuing to
grow, regardless of whether or not boats are being turned back by the Government. An
additional avenue to the same end includes research into mechanisms by which the
government can help manage the tide of asylum seekers at the source, whether it is through
aid, work with local UNHCR efforts, or bilateral programs with the major countries of origin
for refugees that find themselves in Australia, such as efforts to reduce the number of
displaced persons or facilitate their applications for asylum in-country.
My proposal is by no means comprehensive; rather, with the time and resources that
were available to me, I sought to conduct a general overview of the situation, critically
analyze the policy that is in place today, review the known goals of the Government, and
suggest an alternative that is not only more in line with the international expectations and
obligations, but economically and politically sustainable in the long term. I fully recognize
that a substantial amount of research and investigation remains to be done on the technical
details of the policy, the specifics of implementation, and further implications of the program
that I have perhaps overlooked.
One particular question that I did not answer in the outline of my policy concerns
what is to be done for the asylum seekers whose applications fail. Currently, some of those
who have been detained for long periods and are willing to depart yet their country of origin
will not grant them a visa, are approved for a “Removal Pending Bridging Visa” and allowed
to live in the community.150 Other arrivals who are members of the ‘legacy caseload’ of 2012
and 2013 have the right to a review of their application, and upon a second negative outcome,
must make arrangements to return home.151 This process does not apply to boat arrivals since
the Government made its commitment in mid-2013 that no one who arrived by boat would be
allowed on the mainland. For those who make it past the “advanced screening” process and
are transferred to an Offshore Processing Center rather than simply being sent back to
Indonesia in a life boat, the outcome of a failed application is not clear; one drawback of a
system that eschews transparency and accountability. Regardless, I do not agree with
returning boat people to Indonesia, a country where asylum seekers have no rights, or
deporting people to their country of origin without an extensive investigation that ensures that
there is no risk to their safety upon their return. While this question was beyond the confines
of this paper, it is certainly one aspect of a policy alternative that must be addressed.
What I have endeavored to make clear is that the current framework for managing the
boat people predicament is not a long-term solution, while it may be serving a short-term
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purpose of reducing the number of boat arrivals, and subsequently the occasional loss of life
at sea. The costs of the Pacific Solution and Operation Sovereign Borders are exorbitant
nonetheless, and there are serious and negative consequences for the individuals who have
been shown to have almost universally legitimate claims to protection. What I am proposing
on the other hand, is a step closer to a solution that is sustainable, and more importantly,
places the rights of asylum seekers and refugees under international law at the forefront. The
recommendation of brief onshore processing followed by community processing that I have
outlined within these pages is both suitable for the Australian context, and entails lower
economic and human costs. In fact, by bringing the RSD infrastructure back to the Australian
mainland, the costs incurred such as expanding facilities and training staff, will eventually
develop into beneficial outcomes related to a boost for employment rates and the national
economy as a whole. Thus the alternative that I am advancing is not only more cost-efficient
but handles boat arrivals in a way that does not sacrifice their rights nor their mental and
physical health and wellbeing.
The policy option that I am advising the Australian government implement is also
backed up by the precedents of several states that I discussed in Part IV, including our
neighboring New Zealand, where similar programs have had a high degree of success.
Universally high compliance rates for community-based asylum policies in numerous
countries around the world suggest that for the majority of asylum seekers and refugees, they
are more than willing to cooperate with the authorities of the country in which they apply for
protection. Therefore the biggest question is not whether the proposed policy would be
effective or legitimate, but whether it can be made feasible in the minds of Australian
politicians and the general public.
This brings me to what I believe to be the biggest challenge facing refugee advocates
and policymakers in Australia; changing the harsh narrative that has developed over the past
decade with respect to asylums seekers, boat people in particular, and their status as refugees.
Public opinion will not change overnight, and doing so will take a concerted public education
campaign, building on the efforts of organizations like Amnesty International Australia and
the Australian Greens. A key necessity is shifting the debate from one of “us versus them”,
the outsiders, to one about how best we, as a developed industrialized nation, can fulfill our
international responsibilities and best support these people who are exercising their legal right
to seek protection from persecution at home. It is imperative that Australia sets an example
for other developed states that have similar capabilities, because as prominent human rights
lawyer David Manne has said, “If all of the other 147 signatory countries were to embark
upon a similar plan, the international protection framework would collapse.”152 Manne draws
attention to a larger point here; when we deconstruct and untangle all of the factors that
contribute to the harsh anti-refugee attitudes and policies that Australia has been unveiling
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since the 1970s, the underlying problem is the oversight that this is not an issue isolated to
Australia, but part of a global phenomenon.
There are several paths that I would have liked to pursue when conducting research
for this work, had time or resources allowed. These include field work methods such as
interviewing asylum seekers and refugees that have first-hand experiences within the offshore
detention facilities, or have had their vessel turned back by the Australian Navy. Having
access to government documents that detail the specifics costs involved with the current
policy and the numbers of people that have been turned back (with or without proper
processing) since Operation Sovereign Borders has been in place would also have increased
the credibility of the claims that I have presented here. However, as with any work of this
nature, there will always be more that we hope to achieve than it possible, and as an
undergraduate paper for the purpose of an Honors Thesis, I have presented a policy overview
and proposal that can be used as a starting point for further research.
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